Publication: Efectos del Análisis Crediticio sobre los Incentivos Empresariales
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1998
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Fundación Empresa Pública (Fundación SEPI)
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En este trabajo, se estudian los e fectos de la supervisión bancaria ex post sobre los incentivos al esfuerzo del empresario bajo información imperfecta y heterogeneidad en el conjuno de deudores. Se demostrará que bajo condiciones admisibles, la supervisión bancaria puede desalentar el esfuerzo del empresario incluso hasta el extremo de disminuir el bienestar social. También se probará que este resultado será tanto más probable cuanto mayor sea la calidad del conjunto de empresarios.
This paper studies the effects of ex post bank monitoring on entrepreneurial incentives. The model in developed under imperfect information and with a heterogeneus set of borrowers. I prove that, under feasible conditions, monitoring can discourage the entrepreneurs' effort and disminish the efficiency of the credit market. I also show that the higher is the quality of the set of entrepreneurs the more likely is this result.
This paper studies the effects of ex post bank monitoring on entrepreneurial incentives. The model in developed under imperfect information and with a heterogeneus set of borrowers. I prove that, under feasible conditions, monitoring can discourage the entrepreneurs' effort and disminish the efficiency of the credit market. I also show that the higher is the quality of the set of entrepreneurs the more likely is this result.
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Investigaciones Económicas (1998), 22(3), 361-392