An economic model of scientific rules

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dc.contributor.author Ferreira, José Luis
dc.contributor.author Zamora-Bonilla, Jesús
dc.date.accessioned 2014-05-30T09:36:18Z
dc.date.available 2014-05-30T09:36:18Z
dc.date.issued 2006-07
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Economics and Philosophy (2006), 22(2), 191-212.
dc.identifier.issn 1474-0028 (online)
dc.identifier.issn 0266-2671 (print)
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5152
dc.description.abstract Empirical reports on scientific competition show that scientists can be depicted as self-interested, strategically behaving agents. Nevertheless, we argue that recognition-seeking scientists will have an interest in establishing methodological norms which tend to select theories of a high epistemic value, and that these norms will be still more stringent if the epistemic value of theories appears in the utility function of scientists, either directly or instrumentally.
dc.description.sponsorship The authors gratefully acknowledges financial support from DGI grant BEC2002-03715 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura), PB98-0495-C08-01 and BFF2002-03656 (Ministerio de Educación y Cultura).
dc.format.extent 22
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Cambridge of University Press
dc.rights © Cambridge of University Press
dc.title An economic model of scientific rules
dc.type article
dc.type.review PeerReviewed
dc.description.status Publicado
dc.relation.publisherversion http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267106000861
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi 10.1017/S0266267106000861
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 191
dc.identifier.publicationissue 2
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 212
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Economics and Philosophy
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 22
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