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On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-valued Auctions

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4418
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0628
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OnSome_GEB_1998_Frutos_ps.PDF (892.77 KB)
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1998
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Elsevier
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Abstract
Equilibria are constructed for classes of game models of sequenced second-price auctions having identical common-valued objects. In some of these the equilibrium price falls on average, and in others the seller loses on average by committing to announce publicly something that he knows. Both of these possibilities are surprises
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Games and Economic Behavior. 1998, vol. 23, p. 201-221
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