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An Experiment on Nash Implementation

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/3502
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CABRALES_WPUPF_1998_300_CA.pdf (319.25 KB)
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1998-06
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Universidad Pompeu Fabra. Departamento de Economia y Empresa
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We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We nd that this mechanism successfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a ne on nondesignated dissidents. We o er some explanations for the imperfect implementation,including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.
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