Publication:
Influential opinion leaders

Thumbnail Image
Identifiers
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34952
ISSN: 0013-0133
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12100
UXXI: AR/0000014473
Files
opinion_EJ_2014_ps.pdf (532.3 KB)
Publication date
2014-12-01
Defense date
Authors
Advisors
Tutors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Impact
Google Scholar
Export
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Abstract
We present a two-stage coordination game in which early choices of experts with special interests are observed by followers who move in the second stage. We show that the equilibrium outcome is biased toward the experts’ interests even though followers know the distribution of expert interests. Expert influence is fully decentralised in the sense that each individual expert has a negligible impact. The bias in favour of experts results from a social learning effect that is multiplied through a coordination motive. We apply our results to the onset of social movements and to the diffusion of products with network externalities.
Description
Keywords
Regime change, Global games, Information, Revolution, Coordination, Diffusion, Networks, Cascades, Activism, Attacks
Bibliographic citation
Loeper, A., Steiner, J., & Stewart, C. (2014). Influential Opinion Leaders. The Economic Journal, 124 (581), pp. 1147-1167.
Collections
DEE - Artículos de Revistas