Publication:
Continuity and Robustness of Bayesian Equilibria in Tullock Contests

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/28116
ISSN: 2340-5031
UXXI: DT/0000001662
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2019-02
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Abstract
We study the continuity and robustness of the Bayesian equilibria of Tullock contests with incomplete information. We show that the Bayesian equilibrium correspondence is upper semicontinuous. We identify conditions under which the Bayesian equilibrium correspondence of Tullock contests with a unique equilibrium is also lower semicontinous. Furthermore, when the Bayesian equilibrium is unique, it is robust to small perturbations of the contest's attributes (the contest success function, and the players' information, value for the prize, and cost of effort).
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Tullock Contests, Incomplete Information, Bayesian Correspondence, Robustness of Equilibria
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE