On bidding markets: the role of competition

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dc.contributor.author Loyola, Gino
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2008-07-02T11:52:42Z
dc.date.available 2008-07-02T11:52:42Z
dc.date.issued 2008-01
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/2730
dc.description.abstract This paper analyzes the effects of industrial concentration on bidding behaviour and hence, on the seller´s expected proceeds. These effects are studied under the CIPI model, an affiliated value set-up that nests a variety of valuation and information environments. We formally decompose the revenue effects coming from less competition into four types: a competition effect, an inference effect, a winner´s curse effect and a sampling effect. The properties of these effects are discussed and conditions for (non) monotonicity of both the equilibrium bid and revenue are stated. Our results suggest that it is more likely that the seller benefits from less competition in markets with more complete valuation and information structures.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 08-18
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Auctions
dc.subject.other Competition
dc.subject.other Affiliation
dc.subject.other Inference
dc.title On bidding markets: the role of competition
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel C62
dc.subject.jel D44
dc.subject.jel D82
dc.subject.jel L41
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.identifier.repec we083318
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