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Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/26081
ISSN: 2340-5031
UXXI: DT/0000001597
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we1717.pdf (572.56 KB)
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2017-12-18
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Abstract
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.
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Many-to-many markets, Acyclicity, Stability, Two-sided Group Strategy-proofness, Singleton core
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DE - Working Papers. Economics. WE