Dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo

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dc.contributor.author Dziuda, Wiola
dc.contributor.author Loeper, Antoine
dc.date.accessioned 2017-09-26T15:19:06Z
dc.date.available 2018-08-01T22:00:06Z
dc.date.issued 2016-08
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation Dziuda, W., Loeper, A., (2016), Dynamic Collective Choice with Endogenous Status Quo. Journal of Political Economy , v. 124, n. 4, pp. 1148 - 1186.
dc.identifier.issn 0022-3808
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25182
dc.description.abstract We analyze a bargaining situation in which preferences evolve over time and the previous agreement becomes the next status quo. The endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players' conflict of interest: Players disagree more often than under exogenous status quo. This leads to inefficiencies and status quo inertia. Under certain conditions, the negotiations can come to a complete gridlock: Players never reach an agreement. Gridlock can occur between players with arbitrarily similar preferences, provided they are sufficiently patient. In legislative settings, our model predicts polarization and explains why legislators may fail to react promptly to economic shocks.
dc.description.sponsorship Loeper acknowledges the financial support from the Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain), grants ECO-2013-42710-P, MDM-2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco CM (S2015/HUM3444).
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher University of Chicago Press
dc.rights © University of Chicago Press
dc.subject.other Legislative policy-making
dc.subject.other Political-economy
dc.subject.other Monetary-policy
dc.subject.other Positive theory
dc.subject.other Polarization
dc.subject.other Inefficiency
dc.subject.other Government
dc.subject.other Committee
dc.subject.other Democracy
dc.subject.other Majority
dc.title Dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo
dc.type article
dc.subject.eciencia Economía
dc.identifier.doi https://doi.org/10.1086/686747
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. ECO-2013-42710-P
dc.relation.projectID Gobierno de España. MDM-2014-0431
dc.relation.projectID Comunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444/MADECO-CM
dc.type.version acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage 1148
dc.identifier.publicationissue 4
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage 1186
dc.identifier.publicationtitle Journal of Political Economy
dc.identifier.publicationvolume 124
dc.identifier.uxxi AR/0000017488
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