Publication: Essays in voluntary disclosure and information sharing
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2014-04
Defense date
2014-06-24
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Abstract
El objetivo de esta tesis es identificar y analizar nuevos factores, no investigados previamente por la literatura contable, que incentiven la revelación voluntaria de información. Puesto que las consecuencias de revelar información varían en función del entorno en el que dicha información es revelada, el presente análisis se realizará desde dos perspectivas distintas: revelar información al mercado en general y compartir información con socios comerciales. En el primer capítulo exploramos como la propensión a revelar información al mercado es influenciada por la forma en que otras organizaciones han revelado información en el pasado. De esta forma, nuestros resultados muestran que las firmas imitan a otras empresas el mismo hecho de revelar la información independientemente del contenido, pero en función de dos factores: la incertidumbre y la lucha por mantener su posición competitiva en el mercado. Además, la segunda razón parece ser dominante. En el segundo capítulo, se analiza el flujo interno de información durante negociaciones entre socios comerciales. Específicamente exploramos como las penalizaciones por acuerdos tardíos modifican la usualmente asumida relación negativa entre el poder de negociación de los socios comerciales y su disposición a compartir información. Nuestros resultados soportan la idea de que la interacción entre las penalizaciones por acuerdos tardíos y el poder de negociación de los socios comerciales genera incentivos que son capaces de disminuir, al menos en cierto grado, el efecto negativo del poder de negociación sobre la disposición a dar información
The global motivation for this work is the identification and analysis of unexplored factors driving firm’s voluntary disclosure of strategic information. Since the motivation and consequences of disclosing information change according to the disclosure environment, we conduct our analysis from two different perspectives: disclosing information to markets and sharing information internally with commercial partners. In the first essay we explore how firms’ propensity to disclose information to the market is influenced by the previous disclosing behavior of other players in the market. Our results show that firms imitate their peers both to deal with uncertainty as well as for competitive reasons. Nevertheless, however, the second reason tends to be dominant. In the second essay, we analyze the internal information flow during negotiations between commercial partners. Specifically, we explore how penalties for delay influence the usually found negative relation between traders’ bargaining power and their willingness to share accounting information during negotiations. Our results support our main thesis, and we conclude that the interaction between the penalizations for delay and the bargaining power are able to create, at least to some extent, incentives to diminish the negative effects of bargaining power over information sharing
The global motivation for this work is the identification and analysis of unexplored factors driving firm’s voluntary disclosure of strategic information. Since the motivation and consequences of disclosing information change according to the disclosure environment, we conduct our analysis from two different perspectives: disclosing information to markets and sharing information internally with commercial partners. In the first essay we explore how firms’ propensity to disclose information to the market is influenced by the previous disclosing behavior of other players in the market. Our results show that firms imitate their peers both to deal with uncertainty as well as for competitive reasons. Nevertheless, however, the second reason tends to be dominant. In the second essay, we analyze the internal information flow during negotiations between commercial partners. Specifically, we explore how penalties for delay influence the usually found negative relation between traders’ bargaining power and their willingness to share accounting information during negotiations. Our results support our main thesis, and we conclude that the interaction between the penalizations for delay and the bargaining power are able to create, at least to some extent, incentives to diminish the negative effects of bargaining power over information sharing
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Keywords
Información contable, Sistema de información, Comunicación en la empresa