Learning by Fund-raising

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dc.contributor.author Name Correa, Álvaro
dc.contributor.editor Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned 2014-05-07T14:25:46Z
dc.date.available 2014-05-07T14:25:46Z
dc.date.issued 2014-05-01
dc.identifier.issn 2340-5031
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10016/18862
dc.description.abstract From experience, fund-raisers learn to become more efficient solicitors. This paper incorporates fund-raising technology into the theory of charitable giving. A full characterization of the solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of fund-raising costs is provided. The strategy identi.es a fundraiser incentive to invest in learning by soliciting some early donors who would give less than their solicitation costs. A notion of “excessive” fund-raising is introduced. It is shown that this may worsen with learning. Our model also accomodates a technology with overhead costs. An extension with rising solicitation costs is also considered.
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries UC3M Working Papers Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries 14-08
dc.rights Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.other Fund-raising
dc.subject.other Solicitation cost
dc.subject.other Charitable giving
dc.title Learning by Fund-raising
dc.type workingPaper
dc.subject.jel H00
dc.subject.jel H30
dc.subject.jel H50
dc.rights.accessRights openAccess
dc.type.version submitedVersion
dc.identifier.uxxi DT/0000001198
dc.identifier.repec we1408
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