Publication: Ownership structure and minority expropriation : the case for multiple blockholders
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Publication date
2012-06
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Tutors
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Taylor & Francis
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Abstract
This article investigates minority expropriation in closely-held firms. Using
a sample of Spanish firms for the period from 1996 to 2006, we find that
firms that are more vulnerable to minority expropriation have blockholders
controlling groups with aggregate equity stakes that are far
removed from 50%, which is the point that maximizes the chances of
expropriation. Moreover, performance improves when the controlling
group’s stake moves away from the region where expropriation is more
likely – the alignment effect – and, if within this region, when the number of
group members increases – the bargaining effect
Description
Keywords
Multiple blockholders, Performance, Minority expropriation, Ownership structure, Controlling group
Bibliographic citation
Applied Financial Economics, 2012, v. 22, n. 24, pp. 2075–2083