Publication: Market based compensation, trading and liquidity
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2004-11
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Abstract
This paper examines the role of trading and liquidity in a large competitive market with dispersed heterogenous information on market-based managerial compensation. The paper recognizes the endogenous nature of a firm's stock price - it is the outcome of self-interested speculative trading motivated by imperfect information about future firm value. Using the stock price as performance measure means bench-marking the manager's performance against the market's expectation of that performance. We obtain two main results: first, the degree of market-based compensation is proportional to the market depth, which is a measure of the ease of information trading. Secondly, using the dynamic trading model of Vives (1995) we show that if the investment horizon of informed traders decreases, at equilibrium the managerial e.ort reduces, and the optimal contract prescribes stock-compensation with longer vesting period.