Publication: Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de Economía | es |
dc.contributor.author | Name Correa, Álvaro | |
dc.contributor.author | Yildirim, Huseyin | |
dc.contributor.funder | Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (España) | es |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-05-17T18:17:38Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-05-17T18:17:38Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-11-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | We examine the consequences of vote transparency in committees whose members fear being blamed by interested observers for casting an unfavorable vote. We show that while individually undesirable, such social pressure can improve the collective decision by mitigating a voting externality. Hence, organizations may adopt public voting when the fear of blame is too little, and secret voting when the fear is too much. We also show that public voting is particularly desirable in committees with overly biased members or overly biased voting rules against the alternative. Anecdotal evidence supports our findings. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | Financial supports from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation, grant #ECO2013-42710-P, and Juan de la Cierva Fellowship (Name-Correa), as well as the dean’s research fund at Duke University (Yildirim) are greatly appreciated | en |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Name-Correa, A. J., & Yildirim, H. (2019). Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees. Journal of Economic Theory,184, p. 104943. | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104943 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0022-0531 | |
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage | 1 | es |
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage | 45 | es |
dc.identifier.publicationtitle | JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | es |
dc.identifier.publicationvolume | 184 | es |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34832 | |
dc.identifier.uxxi | AR/0000024428 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | es |
dc.relation.projectID | Gobierno de España. ECO2013-42710-P | es |
dc.rights | © Elsevier, 2019 | es |
dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España | * |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | es |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | * |
dc.subject.eciencia | Economía | es |
dc.subject.jel | D02 | |
dc.subject.jel | D71 | |
dc.subject.jel | D91 | |
dc.subject.other | Blame | en |
dc.subject.other | Committee | en |
dc.subject.other | Social pressure | en |
dc.subject.other | Transparency | en |
dc.title | Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees | en |
dc.type | research article | * |
dc.type.hasVersion | AM | * |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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