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Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorName Correa, Álvaro
dc.contributor.authorYildirim, Huseyin
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Ciencia e Innovación (España)es
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-17T18:17:38Z
dc.date.available2022-05-17T18:17:38Z
dc.date.issued2019-11-01
dc.description.abstractWe examine the consequences of vote transparency in committees whose members fear being blamed by interested observers for casting an unfavorable vote. We show that while individually undesirable, such social pressure can improve the collective decision by mitigating a voting externality. Hence, organizations may adopt public voting when the fear of blame is too little, and secret voting when the fear is too much. We also show that public voting is particularly desirable in committees with overly biased members or overly biased voting rules against the alternative. Anecdotal evidence supports our findings.en
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial supports from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation, grant #ECO2013-42710-P, and Juan de la Cierva Fellowship (Name-Correa), as well as the dean’s research fund at Duke University (Yildirim) are greatly appreciateden
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationName-Correa, A. J., & Yildirim, H. (2019). Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees. Journal of Economic Theory,184, p. 104943.en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.104943
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage1es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage45es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORYes
dc.identifier.publicationvolume184es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/34832
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000024428
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherElsevieres
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2013-42710-Pes
dc.rights© Elsevier, 2019es
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accesses
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.jelD02
dc.subject.jelD71
dc.subject.jelD91
dc.subject.otherBlameen
dc.subject.otherCommitteeen
dc.subject.otherSocial pressureen
dc.subject.otherTransparencyen
dc.titleSocial pressure, transparency, and voting in committeesen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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