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Imperfect imitation can enhance cooperation

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Matemáticases
dc.affiliation.grupoinvUC3M. Grupo de Investigación: Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC)es
dc.contributor.authorPérez Roca, Carlos
dc.contributor.authorCuesta, José A.
dc.contributor.authorSánchez, Angel
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-09T12:33:26Z
dc.date.available2010-03-09T12:33:26Z
dc.date.issued2009-08
dc.description5 pages, 4 figures.-- PACS nrs.: 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le, 89.65.-s.-- ArXiv pre-print available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.0869
dc.description.abstractThe promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between both regimes, we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional imitation with another imitative rule. We find that, surprisingly, in many social dilemmas this rule yields higher cooperative levels than any of the two original ones. This nontrivial effect occurs because the basic rules induce a separation of timescales in the microscopic processes at cluster interfaces. The result is robust in the space of 2×2 symmetric games, on regular lattices and on scale-free networks.
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is supported by MICINN (Spain) under Grants Ingenio-MATHEMATICA and MOSAICO, and by Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) under Grants SIMUMAT-CM and MOSSNOHO-CM.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationEurophysics Letters 87, 47005 (2009)
dc.identifier.doi10.1209/0295-5075/87/48005
dc.identifier.issn0295-5075 (Print)
dc.identifier.issn1286-4854 (Online)
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/7194
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherEDP Sciences
dc.publisherIOP Publishing
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1209/0295-5075/87/48005
dc.rights© Europhysics Letters Association (EPLA)
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaMatemáticas
dc.subject.other[PACS] Dynamics of evolution
dc.subject.other[PACS] Decision theory and game theory
dc.subject.other[PACS] Social and economic systems
dc.titleImperfect imitation can enhance cooperation
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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