Asymmetric Price-Benefit Auctions

Publication:
Asymmetric Price-Benefit Auctions

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Frutos, María Ángeles de
dc.date.accessioned	2009-06-15T11:48:19Z
dc.date.accessioned	2010-02-10T16:33:16Z
dc.date.available	2009-06-15T11:48:19Z
dc.date.available	2010-02-10T16:33:16Z
dc.date.issued	2000
dc.description.abstract	This paper studies the performance of two auction procedures for allocating the assets of a dissolving partnership when partners' valuations for the assets are independent and asymmetrically distributed, with one partner reputed to be more interested in the assets to be divided. We provide results on existence, and uniqueness of the equilibrium induced by these auctions. Comparative statics are developed, especially the differences between relative efficiency and revenue from the two auctions.
dc.description.status	Publicado
dc.format.mimetype	text/plain
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	Games and Economic Behavior. 2000, vol. 33, nº 1, p. 48-71
dc.identifier.doi	10.1006/game.1999.0772
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/4413
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Elsevier
dc.relation.publisherversion	http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0772
dc.rights	© Elsevier
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.title	Asymmetric Price-Benefit Auctions
dc.type	research article	*
dc.type.review	PeerReviewed
dspace.entity.type	Publication

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