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Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorAlcalde, J.
dc.contributor.authorPérez-Castrillo, D. J.
dc.contributor.authorRomero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.otherIVIE
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-02T16:13:33Z
dc.date.available2009-11-02T16:13:33Z
dc.date.issued1997
dc.description.abstractWe implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium using a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (in the first stage). Then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, we show that, if agents`preference are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium that firms`optimal correspondence when firms employ undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another simple sequential mechanism to implement workers`optimal correspondence when agents`preferences are additive.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/5626
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking papers
dc.relation.ispartofseriesAD 10
dc.rights©IVIE
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherJob Matching Markets
dc.subject.otherimplementation
dc.subject.othermechanism design
dc.titleHiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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