Publication:
Information disclosure in optimal auctions

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.affiliation.institutoUC3M. Instituto para el Desarrollo de Empresas y Mercados (INDEM)es
dc.contributor.authorGanuza, Juan-José
dc.contributor.authorPenalva, José
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto para el Desarrollo Empresarial (INDEM)es
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-17T14:09:12Z
dc.date.available2014-03-17T14:09:12Z
dc.date.issued2014-03
dc.description.abstractA celebrated result in auction theory is that the optimal reserve price in the standard private value setting does not depend on the number of bidders. We modify the framework by considering that the seller controls the accuracy with which bidders learn their valuations, and show that in such a case, the greater the number of bidders the more restrictive the reserve price. We also show that the auctioneer provides more information when using an optimal auction mechanism than when the object is always sold.es
dc.description.sponsorshipJuan-José Ganuza gratefully acknowledges the support of the Barcelona GSE Research, the government of Catalonia, and the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science Through Project ECO 2011-28965. Jose Penalva acknowledges the support of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science Through Project ECO 2012-36559.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn1989-8843es
dc.identifier.repecid-14-02
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/18543
dc.identifier.uxxiDT/0000001179es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.relation.ispartofseriesBusiness economic serieses
dc.relation.ispartofseries14-02es
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO 2012-36559es
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2011-28965
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 Españaes
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.jelC72es
dc.subject.jelD44es
dc.subject.jelD82es
dc.subject.jelD83es
dc.subject.otherAuctionsen
dc.subject.otherPrivate valuesen
dc.subject.otherInformation disclosureen
dc.titleInformation disclosure in optimal auctionsen
dc.typeworking paper*
dc.type.hasVersionSMUR*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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