Publication:
Information advantage in common-value classic Tullock contests

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorAiche, A.
dc.contributor.authorEiny, Ezra
dc.contributor.authorHaimanko, Ori
dc.contributor.authorMoreno, Diego
dc.contributor.authorSelay, A.
dc.contributor.authorShitovitz, Benyamin
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.otheres
dc.date.accessioned2016-12-07T12:55:06Z
dc.date.available2016-12-07T12:55:06Z
dc.date.issued2016-11
dc.description.abstractWe show that in a common-value classic Tullock contests with incomplete information a player's information advantage is rewarded. Interestingly, in two-player contests both players exert the same expected effort. We characterize the equilibrium of two-player contests in which a player has information advantage, and show that this player exerts a larger effort and wins the price with a larger probability the larger is the realized value of the prize, although he wins the prize less frequently than his opponent. In addition, we find that players may exert more effort in a Tullock contest than in an all-pay auction.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031es
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10016/23939
dc.identifier.uxxiDT/0000001492es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M working papers. Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseries16-18es
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.jelC72es
dc.subject.jelD44es
dc.subject.jelD82es
dc.subject.otherInformation advantageen
dc.subject.otherAsymmetric informationen
dc.subject.otherCommon-valueen
dc.subject.otherTullock contestsen
dc.titleInformation advantage in common-value classic Tullock contestsen
dc.typeworking paper*
dc.type.hasVersionAO*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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