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The shared reward dilemma

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Estadísticaes
dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Matemáticases
dc.affiliation.grupoinvUC3M. Grupo de Investigación: Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC)es
dc.contributor.authorCuesta, José A.
dc.contributor.authorJiménez Recaredo, Raúl José
dc.contributor.authorSánchez, Angel
dc.contributor.authorLugo, Haydeé
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-09T14:07:58Z
dc.date.available2010-03-09T14:07:58Z
dc.date.issued2008-03-21
dc.description11 pages, 5 figures.-- ArXiv pre-print available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/0707.2587
dc.descriptionFinal publisher version available Open Access at: http://gisc.uc3m.es/~cuesta/papers-year.html
dc.description.abstractOne of the most direct human mechanisms of promoting cooperation is rewarding it. We study the effect of sharing a reward among cooperators in the most stringent form of social dilemma, namely the prisoner's dilemma (PD). Specifically, for a group of players that collect payoffs by playing a pairwise PD game with their partners, we consider an external entity that distributes a fixed reward equally among all cooperators. Thus, individuals confront a new dilemma: on the one hand, they may be inclined to choose the shared reward despite the possibility of being exploited by defectors; on the other hand, if too many players do that, cooperators will obtain a poor reward and defectors will outperform them. By appropriately tuning the amount to be shared a vast variety of scenarios arises, including the traditional ones in the study of cooperation as well as more complex situations where unexpected behavior can occur. We provide a complete classification of the equilibria of the n-player game as well as of its evolutionary dynamics.
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is partially supported by Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Spain) under Grants Ingenio-MATHEMATICA, MOSAICO, and NAN2004-9087-C03-03 and by Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) under Grants SIMUMAT-CM and MOSSNOHO-CM.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationJournal of Theoretical Biology, 2008, vol. 251, n. 2, p. 253-263
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.11.022
dc.identifier.issn0022-5193
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/7199
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.11.022
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaMatemáticas
dc.subject.otherReward
dc.subject.otherSocial dilemma
dc.subject.otherPrisoner's dilemma
dc.subject.othern-Player game
dc.subject.otherCooperation
dc.subject.otherEvolutionary dynamics
dc.subject.otherNash equilibria
dc.titleThe shared reward dilemma
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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