Publication:
Denial of corruption: voluntary disclosure of bribery information

Simple item page
dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.contributor.authorGago-Rodríguez, Susana
dc.contributor.authorMárquez Illescas, Gilberto
dc.contributor.authorNúñez-Nickel, Manuel
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)es
dc.contributor.funderComunidad de Madrides
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-17T15:32:23Z
dc.date.available2022-05-17T15:32:23Z
dc.date.issued2020-03-01
dc.description.abstractThis study explores the rationality behind firms’ decision to admit or deny their involvement in bribery when responding to confidential surveys conducted by international agencies (such as the World Bank). Specifically, we posit that firms’ reluc-tance to provide accurate information about their engagement in bribery is at least to some extent contingent on certain situ-ational factors. In other words, we claim that this behavior is context dependent. The paper uses the notions provided by the theory of planned behavior to understand the way in which the corruption of the legal environment, the intensity of market competition, and identification risk influence firms’ decision to lie about their involvement in bribery. To test these notions, we use databases from the fifth wave of the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, country-level data from the Kauffman Foundation and macroeconomic (i.e., countrylevel) information from the World Bank database. We run ordinary least squares with geographic region-clustered standard errors on data from 30 countries and 6122 individual firms during the period 2012–2013. Consistent with our expectations, the results indicate that firms operating within more corrupt legal environments, facing more competition, and bearing a higher risk of being identified are less likely to deny their involvement in bribery. We conclude that not all firms have the same incentives to lie about their participation in bribery, and therefore, identifying the drivers of this heterogeneity may help policymakers better assess the reliability of bribery information collected through confidential surveys.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThis study was funded by Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant Numbers ECO-2010-22105-C03-03 and ECO2013-45864-P); Community of Madrid (Grant Number S2015/HUM-3417); and FEDER (Grant Number UNC315-EE-3636).en
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationGago-Rodríguez, S., Márquez-Illescas, G., & Núñez-Nickel, M. (2018). Denial of Corruption: Voluntary Disclosure of Bribery Information. Journal of Business Ethics, 162 (3), pp. 609-626.en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10551-018-3989-9
dc.identifier.issn0167-4544
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage609es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage626es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleJOURNAL OF BUSINESS ETHICSes
dc.identifier.publicationvolume162es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/34829
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000025046
dc.publisherSpringeres
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2010-22105-C03-03es
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2013-45864-Pes
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3417es
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. UNC315-EE-3636es
dc.rights© Springer Nature B.V.es
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.subject.otherVoluntary disclosureen
dc.subject.otherBriberyen
dc.subject.otherCompetitionen
dc.subject.otherCorruptionen
dc.titleDenial of corruption: voluntary disclosure of bribery informationen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
denial_JBE_2018_ps.pdf
Size:
1.03 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
Collections
DEE - Artículos de Revistas