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An impure public good model with lotteries in large groups

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorCabrales Goitia, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorLugo, Haydeé
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-28T09:35:28Z
dc.date.available2011-03-28T09:35:28Z
dc.date.issued2011-03
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-best levels.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/octet-stream
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe1107
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/10602
dc.identifier.uxxiDT/0000000885
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries11-07
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.jelD64
dc.subject.jelH21
dc.subject.jelH41
dc.subject.otherLotteries
dc.subject.otherPublic good
dc.subject.otherWarm glow
dc.subject.otherEfficiency
dc.titleAn impure public good model with lotteries in large groups
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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