Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values

Publication:
Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Araujo, Aloisio
dc.contributor.author	Castro, Luciano I. de
dc.date.accessioned	2006-11-09T11:41:49Z
dc.date.available	2006-11-09T11:41:49Z
dc.date.issued	2006-08
dc.description.abstract	We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many types of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present a reasonable counterexample for interdependent values auctions that shows that sometimes all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. Nevertheless, we give sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence.
dc.format.extent	648039 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	2340-5031
dc.identifier.repec	we065320
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/378
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2006-20
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.title	Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication

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