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Credible Equilibria in Games with Utility Changing during the Play

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5158
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Credible_WPNU_1992_988_preprint.pdf (1.41 MB)
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1992
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Whenever one deals with an interactive decision situation of long duration, one has to take into account that priorities of the participants may change during the conflicto In this paper we propose an extensiveform game model to handle such situations and suggest and study a solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium. We also discuss possible variants to this concept and applications of the model to other types of games.
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Publicado por Tilburg Center Economic Research 1992
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