Publication:
What do unions do (to nonunion workers)?

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.contributor.authorRuiz-Verdú, Pablo
dc.date.accessioned2006-11-07T11:13:56Z
dc.date.available2006-11-07T11:13:56Z
dc.date.issued2004-01
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a model of wage and employment determination under the threat of unionization. The model shows that this threat generally leads nonunion firms to pay higher than competitive wages and to set a level of employment equal to or higher than the competitive employment level. This result holds independently of the model used to represent union-management bargaining, as long as it exhibits an intuitively appealing trade-off between wages and employment (monotonicity). The right-to-manage and the Nash-bargaining models are shown to be monotone, so the result extends to the most commonly used models of unionmanagement bargaining.
dc.format.extent469375 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.repecwb040202
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/90
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorkings Paper. Bussiness Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries2004-02
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEmpresa
dc.titleWhat do unions do (to nonunion workers)?
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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