Publication: What do unions do (to nonunion workers)?
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa | es |
dc.contributor.author | Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2006-11-07T11:13:56Z | |
dc.date.available | 2006-11-07T11:13:56Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper develops a model of wage and employment determination under the threat of unionization. The model shows that this threat generally leads nonunion firms to pay higher than competitive wages and to set a level of employment equal to or higher than the competitive employment level. This result holds independently of the model used to represent union-management bargaining, as long as it exhibits an intuitively appealing trade-off between wages and employment (monotonicity). The right-to-manage and the Nash-bargaining models are shown to be monotone, so the result extends to the most commonly used models of unionmanagement bargaining. | |
dc.format.extent | 469375 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.repec | wb040202 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/90 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Workings Paper. Bussiness Economics | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 2004-02 | |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | |
dc.subject.eciencia | Empresa | |
dc.title | What do unions do (to nonunion workers)? | |
dc.type | working paper | * |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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