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Tax enforcement problems

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorMarhuenda, Francisco
dc.contributor.authorOrtuño Ortín, Ignacio
dc.date.accessioned2009-05-08T14:59:55Z
dc.date.available2009-05-08T14:59:55Z
dc.date.issued1997
dc.description.abstractWe study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationScandinavian Journal of Economics, 1997, v. 99, n. 1, pp. 61-72
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1467-9442.00047
dc.identifier.issn1467-9442 (Online)
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage61
dc.identifier.publicationissue1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage72
dc.identifier.publicationtitleScandinavian Journal of Economics
dc.identifier.publicationvolume99
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/4178
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherBlackwell
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9442.00047
dc.rights© Blackwell
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.titleTax enforcement problems
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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