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A capture theory of committees

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.contributor.authorName Correa, Álvaro
dc.contributor.authorYildirim, Huseyin
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Ciencia e Innovación (España)es
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-18T13:04:24Z
dc.date.available2022-05-18T13:04:24Z
dc.date.issued2018-10-01
dc.description.abstractWhy do committees exist? The extant literature emphasizes that they pool dispersed information across members. In this paper, we argue that they may also serve to discourage outside influence or capture by raising its cost. As such, committees may contain members who are uninformed or who add no new information to the collective decision. We show that the optimal committee is larger when outsiders have larger stakes in its decision or contribute lower-quality proposals, or when its members are more corruptible. We also show that keeping committee members anonymous and accountable for their votes helps deter capture.en
dc.description.sponsorshipFinancial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation, Grant #ECO2013-42710-P, and Juan de la Cierva Fellowship (Name-Correa) as well as the dean’s research fund at Duke University (Yildirim) are greatly appreciateden
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationName-Correa, A. J., & Yildirim, H. (2018). A capture theory of committees. Public Choice, 177 (1-2), pp. 135-154).en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0593-6
dc.identifier.issn0048-5829
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage135es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage154es
dc.identifier.publicationtitlePUBLIC CHOICEen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume177es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/34838
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000021980
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherSpringeres
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2013-42710-Pes
dc.rights© Springer Science+Business Media, LLCes
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.ecienciaEmpresaes
dc.subject.jelD02
dc.subject.jelD71
dc.subject.jelD72
dc.subject.otherCommitteeen
dc.subject.otherCaptureen
dc.subject.otherBribeen
dc.subject.otherThreaten
dc.subject.otherDisclosureen
dc.titleA capture theory of committeesen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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