Publication: A capture theory of committees
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa | es |
dc.contributor.author | Name Correa, Álvaro | |
dc.contributor.author | Yildirim, Huseyin | |
dc.contributor.funder | Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (España) | es |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-05-18T13:04:24Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-05-18T13:04:24Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-10-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | Why do committees exist? The extant literature emphasizes that they pool dispersed information across members. In this paper, we argue that they may also serve to discourage outside influence or capture by raising its cost. As such, committees may contain members who are uninformed or who add no new information to the collective decision. We show that the optimal committee is larger when outsiders have larger stakes in its decision or contribute lower-quality proposals, or when its members are more corruptible. We also show that keeping committee members anonymous and accountable for their votes helps deter capture. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | Financial support from the Spanish Ministry for Science and Innovation, Grant #ECO2013-42710-P, and Juan de la Cierva Fellowship (Name-Correa) as well as the dean’s research fund at Duke University (Yildirim) are greatly appreciated | en |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Name-Correa, A. J., & Yildirim, H. (2018). A capture theory of committees. Public Choice, 177 (1-2), pp. 135-154). | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0593-6 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0048-5829 | |
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage | 135 | es |
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage | 154 | es |
dc.identifier.publicationtitle | PUBLIC CHOICE | en |
dc.identifier.publicationvolume | 177 | es |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34838 | |
dc.identifier.uxxi | AR/0000021980 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | es |
dc.publisher | Springer | es |
dc.relation.projectID | Gobierno de España. ECO2013-42710-P | es |
dc.rights | © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC | es |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | en |
dc.subject.eciencia | Economía | es |
dc.subject.eciencia | Empresa | es |
dc.subject.jel | D02 | |
dc.subject.jel | D71 | |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | |
dc.subject.other | Committee | en |
dc.subject.other | Capture | en |
dc.subject.other | Bribe | en |
dc.subject.other | Threat | en |
dc.subject.other | Disclosure | en |
dc.title | A capture theory of committees | en |
dc.type | research article | * |
dc.type.hasVersion | AM | * |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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