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The Governance of Perpetual Financial Intermediaries

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.contributor.authorPenalva, José S.
dc.contributor.authorVan Bommel, Jos
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-09T18:28:01Z
dc.date.available2022-05-09T18:28:01Z
dc.date.issued2016-12-13
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we re-examine the risk sharing potential of inter- generational financial intermediaries taking into account their governance structure. We argue that asset buffers of perpetual institutions are limited by the temptation of the living stakeholders to renegotiate contributions and distributions. We characterize the renegotiation constraint and show that it severely limits intergenerational risk sharing. Without renegotiation frictions, intermediaries cannot provide higher welfare than a market. The existence of (self-imposed) renegotiation costs relaxes the constraint. By forming a single monopolist intermediary, agents can further improve welfare.en
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationPenalva, J., & van Bommel, J. (2017). The Governance of Perpetual Financial Intermediaries. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 173 (3), pp. 498-522.es
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2372438
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage498es
dc.identifier.publicationissue3es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage522es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economicses
dc.identifier.publicationvolume173es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/34749
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000018924
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherMohr Siebeckes
dc.rights© Mohr Siebeckes
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accesses
dc.subject.jelG21
dc.subject.jelD91
dc.titleThe Governance of Perpetual Financial Intermediariesen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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