Publication:
An economic analysis of corporate directors' fiduciary duties

Simple item page
dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.contributor.authorGutiérrez, María
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-13T10:43:43Z
dc.date.available2010-04-13T10:43:43Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.description.abstractI present a principal-agent model where the shareholders (principal) can take legal action against the director (agent). The court's decision provides a verifiable but costly and imperfect signal on the director's fulfilment of his fiduciary duties. The director's remuneration can be made contingent not only on performance but also upon the court's decision. I show that when damage awards are high enough, the widespread use of liability insurance and limited-liability provisions that is observed in the United States is optimal because it allows for a more efficient litigation strategy to be ex post rational for the shareholders.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationThe RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, v. 34, n. 3, pp. 516-535
dc.identifier.issn07416261
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage516
dc.identifier.publicationissue3
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage535
dc.identifier.publicationtitleThe RAND Journal of Economics
dc.identifier.publicationvolume34
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/7658
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1593744
dc.rights©RAND
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEmpresa
dc.titleAn economic analysis of corporate directors' fiduciary duties
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
Files
Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
economic_gutierrez_RJE_2003_ps.pdf
Size:
976.73 KB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Description:
Download
Collections
DEE - Artículos de Revistas
Economists Online