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Loan officers' screening with credit scores

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.contributor.authorVicente, Sergio
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresaes
dc.date.accessioned2014-10-09T10:30:30Z
dc.date.available2014-10-09T10:30:30Z
dc.date.issued2014-10-01es
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on screening borrowers. Lenders with access to accurate credit scores offer the most valuable borrowers lower interest rates than lenders with an advantage in costly screening. This cream-skimming induces a negative externality, which reduces the value of investing in screening. This distortion translates into excessive lending with credit scores, too little screening, higher default rates than optimal and credit rationing. The model explains some patterns of loan pricing and defaults, as well as of firm selection by types of lenders, which are consistent with the received empirical evidence.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2341-0795
dc.identifier.repecwb142710
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/19462
dc.identifier.uxxiDT/0000001280
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper. Business economic seriesen
dc.relation.ispartofseries14-10
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.jelG14
dc.subject.jelG21
dc.subject.jelG24
dc.subject.jelD82
dc.subject.otherCredit scoresen
dc.subject.otherScreeningen
dc.subject.otherHard and soft informationen
dc.titleLoan officers' screening with credit scoresen
dc.typeworking paper*
dc.type.hasVersionSMUR*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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