Publication: How Evolutionary Dynamics Affects Network Reciprocity in Prisoner's Dilemma
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de Matemáticas | es |
dc.affiliation.grupoinv | UC3M. Grupo de Investigación: Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC) | es |
dc.contributor.author | Cimini, Giulio | |
dc.contributor.author | Sánchez, Angel | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-07-23T11:09:59Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-07-23T11:09:59Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015-03-31 | |
dc.description.abstract | Cooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a conundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been addressed by many, but theoretical studies have yielded contradictory results so far—as the problem is very sensitive to how players adapt their strategy. However, recent experiments with the prisoner's dilemma game played on different networks and in a specific range of payoffs suggest that humans, at least for those experimental setups, do not consider neighbors' payoffs when making their decisions, and that the network structure does not influence the final outcome. In this work we carry out an extensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics, taking into account most of the alternatives that have been proposed so far to implement players' strategy updating process. In this manner we show that the absence of network reciprocity is a general feature of the dynamics (among those we consider) that do not take neighbors' payoffs into account. Our results, together with experimental evidence, hint at how to properly model real people's behavior | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | This work was supported by the Swiss Natural Science Foundation through grant PBFRP2_145872 and by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) through grant PRODIEVO. | en |
dc.description.status | Publicado | |
dc.format.extent | 13 | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 18 (2015) 2- 22, pp. 1-3 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1460-7425 | |
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage | 1 | |
dc.identifier.publicationissue | 2-22 | |
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage | 13 | |
dc.identifier.publicationtitle | Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation | en |
dc.identifier.publicationvolume | 18 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/21460 | |
dc.identifier.uxxi | AR/0000017079 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.publisher | Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation | en |
dc.relation.projectID | Gobierno de España. FIS2011-22449/PRODIEVO | es |
dc.relation.publisherversion | http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/2/22.html | |
dc.rights | © 2015 JASSS | en |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | |
dc.subject.eciencia | Matemáticas | es |
dc.subject.other | Evolutionary Game Theory | en |
dc.subject.other | Prisoner's dilemma | en |
dc.subject.other | Network Reciprocity | en |
dc.title | How Evolutionary Dynamics Affects Network Reciprocity in Prisoner's Dilemma | en |
dc.type | research article | * |
dc.type.hasVersion | VoR | * |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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