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How Evolutionary Dynamics Affects Network Reciprocity in Prisoner's Dilemma

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Matemáticases
dc.affiliation.grupoinvUC3M. Grupo de Investigación: Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos (GISC)es
dc.contributor.authorCimini, Giulio
dc.contributor.authorSánchez, Angel
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-23T11:09:59Z
dc.date.available2015-07-23T11:09:59Z
dc.date.issued2015-03-31
dc.description.abstractCooperation lies at the foundations of human societies, yet why people cooperate remains a conundrum. The issue, known as network reciprocity, of whether population structure can foster cooperative behavior in social dilemmas has been addressed by many, but theoretical studies have yielded contradictory results so far—as the problem is very sensitive to how players adapt their strategy. However, recent experiments with the prisoner's dilemma game played on different networks and in a specific range of payoffs suggest that humans, at least for those experimental setups, do not consider neighbors' payoffs when making their decisions, and that the network structure does not influence the final outcome. In this work we carry out an extensive analysis of different evolutionary dynamics, taking into account most of the alternatives that have been proposed so far to implement players' strategy updating process. In this manner we show that the absence of network reciprocity is a general feature of the dynamics (among those we consider) that do not take neighbors' payoffs into account. Our results, together with experimental evidence, hint at how to properly model real people's behavioren
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported by the Swiss Natural Science Foundation through grant PBFRP2_145872 and by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) through grant PRODIEVO.en
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.extent13
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationJournal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 18 (2015) 2- 22, pp. 1-3en
dc.identifier.issn1460-7425
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage1
dc.identifier.publicationissue2-22
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage13
dc.identifier.publicationtitleJournal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulationen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume18
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/21460
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000017079
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherJournal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulationen
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. FIS2011-22449/PRODIEVOes
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/18/2/22.html
dc.rights© 2015 JASSSen
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaMatemáticases
dc.subject.otherEvolutionary Game Theoryen
dc.subject.otherPrisoner's dilemmaen
dc.subject.otherNetwork Reciprocityen
dc.titleHow Evolutionary Dynamics Affects Network Reciprocity in Prisoner's Dilemmaen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionVoR*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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