Publication:
Group key exchange protocols withstanding ephemeral-key reveals

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Matemáticases
dc.contributor.authorGonzález Vasco, María Isabel
dc.contributor.authorPérez Del Pozo, Ángel Luis
dc.contributor.authorSuarez Corona, Adriana
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)es
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-13T08:46:24Z
dc.date.available2023-12-13T08:46:24Z
dc.date.issued2018-01
dc.description.abstractWhen a group key exchange protocol is executed, the session key is typically extracted from two types of secrets: long-term keys (for authentication) and freshly generated (often random) values. The leakage of this latter so-called ephemeral keys has been extensively analysed in the 2-party case, yet very few works are concerned with it in the group setting. The authors provide a generic group key exchange construction that is strongly secure, meaning that the attacker is allowed to learn both long-term and ephemeral keys (but not both from the same participant, as this would trivially disclose the session key). Their design can be seen as a compiler, in the sense that it builds on a 2-party key exchange protocol which is strongly secure and transforms it into a strongly secure group key exchange protocol by adding only one extra round of communication. When applied to an existing 2-party protocol from Bergsma et al., the result is a 2-round group key exchange protocol which is strongly secure in the standard model, thus yielding the first construction with this property.en
dc.description.sponsorshipM.I. González Vasco and Ángel L. Pérez del Pozo are partially supported by research project MTM2013-41426-R and A. Suárez Corona is supported by MTM2013-45588-C3-1-P, both funded bythe Spanish MINECO.en
dc.format.extent8
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationGonzález Vasco, M. I., Pérez del Pozo, A. L., & Suárez Corona, A. (2018). Group key exchange protocols withstanding ephemeral‐key reveals. IET Information Security, 12(1), 79-86.en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0131
dc.identifier.issn1751-8709
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage79
dc.identifier.publicationissue1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage86
dc.identifier.publicationtitleIET Information Securityen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume12
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/39077
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000032346
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherInstitution of Engineering and Technology (IET)en
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. MTM2013-41426-Res
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. MTM2013-45588-C3-1-Pes
dc.rights© 2020 The Institution of Engineering and Technologyen
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.subject.ecienciaInformáticaes
dc.subject.ecienciaMatemáticases
dc.subject.ecienciaTelecomunicacioneses
dc.subject.otherGroup key exchangeen
dc.subject.otherCompileren
dc.subject.otherEphemeral keysen
dc.subject.otherStrong securityen
dc.titleGroup key exchange protocols withstanding ephemeral-key revealsen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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