Publication: Group key exchange protocols withstanding ephemeral-key reveals
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de Matemáticas | es |
dc.contributor.author | González Vasco, María Isabel | |
dc.contributor.author | Pérez Del Pozo, Ángel Luis | |
dc.contributor.author | Suarez Corona, Adriana | |
dc.contributor.funder | Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (España) | es |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-12-13T08:46:24Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-12-13T08:46:24Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | When a group key exchange protocol is executed, the session key is typically extracted from two types of secrets: long-term keys (for authentication) and freshly generated (often random) values. The leakage of this latter so-called ephemeral keys has been extensively analysed in the 2-party case, yet very few works are concerned with it in the group setting. The authors provide a generic group key exchange construction that is strongly secure, meaning that the attacker is allowed to learn both long-term and ephemeral keys (but not both from the same participant, as this would trivially disclose the session key). Their design can be seen as a compiler, in the sense that it builds on a 2-party key exchange protocol which is strongly secure and transforms it into a strongly secure group key exchange protocol by adding only one extra round of communication. When applied to an existing 2-party protocol from Bergsma et al., the result is a 2-round group key exchange protocol which is strongly secure in the standard model, thus yielding the first construction with this property. | en |
dc.description.sponsorship | M.I. González Vasco and Ángel L. Pérez del Pozo are partially supported by research project MTM2013-41426-R and A. Suárez Corona is supported by MTM2013-45588-C3-1-P, both funded bythe Spanish MINECO. | en |
dc.format.extent | 8 | |
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation | González Vasco, M. I., Pérez del Pozo, A. L., & Suárez Corona, A. (2018). Group key exchange protocols withstanding ephemeral‐key reveals. IET Information Security, 12(1), 79-86. | en |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-ifs.2017.0131 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1751-8709 | |
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage | 79 | |
dc.identifier.publicationissue | 1 | |
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage | 86 | |
dc.identifier.publicationtitle | IET Information Security | en |
dc.identifier.publicationvolume | 12 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/39077 | |
dc.identifier.uxxi | AR/0000032346 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) | en |
dc.relation.projectID | Gobierno de España. MTM2013-41426-R | es |
dc.relation.projectID | Gobierno de España. MTM2013-45588-C3-1-P | es |
dc.rights | © 2020 The Institution of Engineering and Technology | en |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | en |
dc.subject.eciencia | Informática | es |
dc.subject.eciencia | Matemáticas | es |
dc.subject.eciencia | Telecomunicaciones | es |
dc.subject.other | Group key exchange | en |
dc.subject.other | Compiler | en |
dc.subject.other | Ephemeral keys | en |
dc.subject.other | Strong security | en |
dc.title | Group key exchange protocols withstanding ephemeral-key reveals | en |
dc.type | research article | * |
dc.type.hasVersion | AM | * |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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