The Role of Family Ties in Agency Contracts

Gómez-Mejía, Luis R.; Núñez-Nickel, Manuel; Gutiérrez, Isabel

Publication:
The Role of Family Ties in Agency Contracts

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa	es
dc.contributor.author	Gómez-Mejía, Luis R.
dc.contributor.author	Núñez-Nickel, Manuel
dc.contributor.author	Gutiérrez, Isabel
dc.date.accessioned	2010-02-10T09:28:49Z
dc.date.available	2010-02-10T09:28:49Z
dc.date.issued	2001
dc.description.abstract	Drawing on data based on the entire population of Spanish newspapers over 27 years (1966-93), this study shows that firm performance and business risk are much stronger predictors of chief executive tenure when a firm's owners and its executive have family ties and that the organizational consequences of CEO dismissal are more favorable when the replaced CEO is a member of the family owning the firm. The study also demonstrates that executives operating under weakly relational (less ambiguous) contracts are held more accountable for firm performance and business risk outcomes, even under nonfamily contracting.
dc.description.status	Publicado
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	Academy of Management Journal, 2001, v.44, nº 1, pp.81-95
dc.identifier.issn	0001-4273
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage	81
dc.identifier.publicationissue	1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage	95
dc.identifier.publicationtitle	Academy of Management Journal
dc.identifier.publicationvolume	44
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/6823
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.publisher	Academy of Management
dc.rights	©Academy of Management
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.eciencia	Empresa
dc.title	The Role of Family Ties in Agency Contracts
dc.type	research article	*
dc.type.review	PeerReviewed
dspace.entity.type	Publication