Integration versus segmentation in a dealer market

Publication:
Integration versus segmentation in a dealer market

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa	es
dc.contributor.author	Manzano, Carolina
dc.contributor.editor	Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa
dc.date.accessioned	2010-01-19T17:51:21Z
dc.date.available	2010-01-19T17:51:21Z
dc.date.issued	1999-06
dc.description.abstract	This paper compares two trading mechanisms in a dealer market with several securities, asymmetric information and imperfect competition. These two market structures differ in the information received by market makers. While in the first of them they observe the order flows of all assets when setting prices, in the second setting market makers are assumed to observe the order flow corresponding to one security. In order to make this comparison, we analyze several market indicators such as the volatility and the informativeness of equilibrium prices and the unconditional expected profits of insiders under both regimes.
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/6514
dc.language.iso	spa
dc.relation.ispartofseries	UC3M Working papers. Business Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries	99-40-10
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.eciencia	Empresa
dc.subject.jel	G10
dc.title	Integration versus segmentation in a dealer market
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication