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Campaign contests

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorDenter, Philipp
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)es
dc.contributor.funderAgencia Estatal de Investigación (España)es
dc.contributor.funderComunidad de Madrides
dc.date.accessioned2022-06-23T17:31:25Z
dc.date.available2022-08-01T23:00:05Z
dc.date.issued2020-08-01
dc.description.abstractI develop a formal model of political campaigns in which candidates choose how to distribute their resources over two different policy issues. I assume that campaigning on an issue has two simultaneous effects, both rooted in social and cognitive psychology: It increases the perceived quality of the advertising candidate in that issue (persuasion) and it makes the issue more salient (priming), thereby increasing the issue’s perceived importance to the voters. I show that, unlike in the extant literature, interior pure strategy equilibria, in which every candidate campaigns on all issues, exist, if persuasion is sufficiently effective. However, candidates “specialize” by spending more than their contender on the issue, in which they hold a comparative advantage. Further, I show that an issue receives more aggregate spending, if it becomes more important or if voters’ opinions on candidates’ qualities in the issue become weaker. A candidate increases his vote share during the campaign contest, if he has a comparative advantage on the issue that receives more aggregate spending. The contest may therefore be biased in one candidate’s favor and an a priori less popular candidate might be the actual odds on favorite.en
dc.description.sponsorshipI also gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation through grant PBSGP1-135426, of the Ministerio Economia y Competitividad (Spain) through grants ECO2014-55953-P, MDM 2014-0431, and PGC2018-098510-B-I00, and of the Consejeria de Educacion, Juventud y Deportes de la Comunidad de Madrid through grant S2015/HUM-3444es
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationDenter, P. (2020). Campaign contests. European Economic Review, 127, p. 103459es
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103459
dc.identifier.issn0014-2921
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage1es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage23es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleEUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEWen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume127es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/35268
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000027398
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherElsevieres
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2014-55953-Pes
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444es
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. PGC2018-098510-B-I00es
dc.rights© Elsevier, 2020es
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.jelD23
dc.subject.jelD83
dc.subject.otherAdvertisingen
dc.subject.otherCampaign spendingen
dc.subject.otherContestsen
dc.subject.otherElectoral competitionen
dc.subject.otherPrimingen
dc.titleCampaign contestsen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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