Who acquires information in dealer markets?

Rüdiger Sorensen, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien

Publication:
Who acquires information in dealer markets?

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa	es
dc.contributor.author	Rüdiger Sorensen, Jesper
dc.contributor.author	Vigier, Adrien
dc.date.accessioned	2022-04-20T17:20:41Z
dc.date.available	2022-04-20T17:20:41Z
dc.date.issued	2020-04-01
dc.description.abstract	We study information acquisition in dealer markets. We first identify a one- sided strategic complementarity in information acquisition: the more informed traders are, the larger market makers’ gain from becoming informed. When quotes are observable, this effect in turn induces a strategic complementarity in information acquisition amongst market makers. We then derive the equilibrium pattern of information acquisition and examine the implications of our analysis for market liquidity and price discovery. We show that increasing the cost of information can decrease market liquidity and improve price discovery.	en
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	Rüdiger, J., & Vigier, A. (2020). Who Acquires Information in Dealer Markets? En American Economic Review, 110 (4), pp. 1145-1176.	es
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170690
dc.identifier.issn	0002-8282
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage	1145	es
dc.identifier.publicationissue	4	es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage	1176	es
dc.identifier.publicationtitle	AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW	es
dc.identifier.publicationvolume	110	es
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10016/34583
dc.identifier.uxxi	AR/0000025055
dc.language.iso	eng	es
dc.publisher	American Economic Association	es
dc.rights	© The Author(s)	es
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es
dc.subject.jel	O82
dc.subject.jel	O83
dc.subject.jel	G14
dc.title	Who acquires information in dealer markets?	en
dc.type	research article	*
dc.type.hasVersion	VoR	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication