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On the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownership

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorAlipranti, Maria
dc.contributor.authorPetrakis, Emmanuel
dc.contributor.authorSkartados, Panagiotis
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-14T16:17:47Z
dc.date.available2021-09-14T16:17:47Z
dc.date.issued2021-09-14
dc.description.abstractWe consider a vertically related market in which an upstream monopolist supplier trades, via interim observable two-part tariff contracts, with two differentiated goods' downstream Cournot competitors. We show that passive partial backward ownership (PPBO) may be pro-competitive and welfare enhancing. PPBO exacerbates the upstream's commitment problem and yields lower wholesale prices, and higher industry output, consumers surplus, and welfare than in the absence of PPBO.es
dc.description.sponsorshipPetrakis acknowledges financial support from “UC3M-Santander Chairs of Excellence"en
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/33271
dc.identifier.uxxiDT/0000001924es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper. Economicses
dc.relation.ispartofseries21-07es
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.jelD43es
dc.subject.jelL13es
dc.subject.jelL14es
dc.subject.otherPassive Partial Backward Ownershipes
dc.subject.otherVertical Relationses
dc.subject.otherTwo-Part Tariffses
dc.subject.otherInterim Observable Contractses
dc.titleOn the pro-competitive effects of passive partial backward ownershipes
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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