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Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorGonzález Pimienta, Carlos
dc.contributor.authorDe Sinopoli, Francesco
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2007-05-04T08:58:24Z
dc.date.available2007-05-04T08:58:24Z
dc.date.issued2007-04-19
dc.description.abstractIn games with population uncertainty some perfect equilibria are in dominated strategies. We prove that every Poisson game has at least one perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies.
dc.format.extent234447 bytes
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe073117
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/717
dc.language.isoeng
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries07-17
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.otherPoisson games
dc.subject.otherUndominated equilibria
dc.subject.otherPerfect equilibria
dc.titleUndominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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