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Disclosure regime of contract terms and bargaining in vertical markets

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorPetrakis, Emmanuel
dc.contributor.authorSkartados, Panagiotis
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-16T13:47:42Z
dc.date.available2022-02-16T13:47:42Z
dc.date.issued2022-02-16
dc.description.abstractWe consider a vertically related market where an upstream monopolist supplies two downstream Cournot competitors. We allow the vertical contract terms to be either interim observable or secret. We address a dichotomy in the literature by endogenizing the disclosure regime of contract terms. The latter could be set via a Non-Disclosure Agreement. Firms bargain over both the disclosure regime and the contract terms. Our results indicate that when firms trade over two-part tariffs, universal interim observability is the unique equilibrium no matter the bargaining power distribution or the product differentiation. Yet, when firms trade over linear tariffs there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. We also show that under competing vertical chains we get universal interim observability as a unique equilibrium no matter the upstream structure. Our results qualitatively hold under Bertrand competition too. Our welfare analysis indicates that universal interim observability and two-part tariffs yield the highest consumer surplus and total welfare.en
dc.description.sponsorshipPetrakis acknowledges financial support from “UC3M-Santander Chairs of Excellence.”en
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/34144
dc.identifier.uxxiDT/0000001982es
dc.language.isoenges
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking paper. Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseries22-01es
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomíaes
dc.subject.jelD43
dc.subject.jelL13
dc.subject.jelL14
dc.subject.otherBilateral Contractingen
dc.subject.otherVertical Relationsen
dc.subject.otherTwo-Part Tariffsen
dc.subject.otherBargainingen
dc.subject.otherNondisclosure Agreementsen
dc.subject.otherSecret Contractsen
dc.titleDisclosure regime of contract terms and bargaining in vertical marketsen
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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