Publication: Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria
dc.affiliation.dpto | UC3M. Departamento de Economía | es |
dc.contributor.author | Cabrales, Antonio | |
dc.contributor.author | Calvó-Armengol, Antoni | |
dc.contributor.editor | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2007-04-02T08:09:46Z | |
dc.date.available | 2007-04-02T08:09:46Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007-03 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely “selfish” preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. This result holds for a broad class and distribution of social preferences. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are “close”. | |
dc.format.extent | 253643 bytes | |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2340-5031 | |
dc.identifier.repec | we072313 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10016/674 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | UC3M Working papers. Economics; | |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | 07-13 | |
dc.rights | Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España | |
dc.rights.accessRights | open access | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | |
dc.subject.eciencia | Economía | |
dc.subject.other | Contract theory | |
dc.subject.other | Mechanism design | |
dc.subject.other | Envy | |
dc.subject.other | Social preferences | |
dc.subject.other | Skill segregation | |
dc.title | Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria | |
dc.type | working paper | * |
dspace.entity.type | Publication |
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