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Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/34252
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12374
UXXI: AR/0000030286
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managing_RJOE_2021.pdf (761.94 KB)
anexo_managing_RJOE_2021.pdf (192.21 KB)
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2021-06-01
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Wiley
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We study optimal methods for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), a technique to achieve settlement and avoid costly adversarial hearings. Participation is voluntary. Disputants are privately informed about their marginal cost of evidence provision. If ADR fails to engender settlement, the disputants can use the information obtained during ADR to determine what evidence to provide in an adversarial hearing. Optimal ADR induces an asymmetric information structure but makes the learning report-independent. It is ex ante fair and decreases the disputants’ expenditures, even if they fail to settle.We highlight the importance of real-world mediation techniques, such as caucusing, for implementing optimal ADR.
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Balzer, B., & Schneider, J. (2021). Managing a conflict: optimal alternative dispute resolution. En The RAND Journal of Economics, 52 (2), pp. 415- 445
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