Publication:
Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria

dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorCabrales, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorAntoni, Calvó-Armengol
dc.date.accessioned2009-02-16T11:52:51Z
dc.date.available2009-02-16T11:52:51Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small deviations from purely “selfish” preferences leads to widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers of different abilities tend to work in different firms, as long as they care somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are “close”. This result holds for a broad class and distribution of social preferences.
dc.description.statusPublicado
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationJournal of Economic Theory. 2008, vol. 139, nº 1, p. 99-113
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.003
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/3658
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherElsevier
dc.relation.publisherversionhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.08.003
dc.rights© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.jelA13
dc.subject.jelC72
dc.subject.jelD64
dc.subject.jelD80
dc.subject.jelJ41
dc.subject.otherContract theory
dc.subject.otherMechanism design
dc.subject.otherEnvy
dc.subject.otherSocial preferences
dc.subject.otherSkill segregation
dc.titleInterdependent preferences and segregating equilibria
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.reviewPeerReviewed
dspace.entity.typePublication
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