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Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorCorchón, Luis C.
dc.contributor.authorDahm, Matthias
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
dc.date.accessioned2009-11-18T13:41:48Z
dc.date.available2009-11-18T13:41:48Z
dc.date.issued2009-11
dc.description.abstractWe analyze how a contest organizer chooses the winner when the contestants.efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We define the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.repecwe097343
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/5719
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries09-43
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.ecienciaEconomía
dc.subject.jelC72
dc.subject.jelD72
dc.subject.jelD74
dc.subject.otherEndogenous contests
dc.subject.otherContest success function
dc.subject.otherMixed-Strategies
dc.titleWelfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit
dc.typeworking paper*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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