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Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.contributor.authorRomero-Medina, Antonio
dc.contributor.authorTriossi, Matteo
dc.contributor.editorUniversidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economíaes
dc.date.accessioned2018-02-06T07:51:47Z
dc.date.available2018-02-06T07:51:47Z
dc.date.issued2018-01-23
dc.description.abstractWe study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms through which hospitals make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to doctors. The inclusion of contracts shrinks the set of equilibrium outcomes and harms doctors more than hospitals, but it maintains the stability of the set of equilibrium outcomes. Our analysis reveals the existence of a first-mover advantage that is absent from the model without contracts. The mechanisms of this class are outcome equivalent and implement the set of stable allocations in subgame perfect equilibrium when enough competitive pressure is present. Equilibrium outcomes form a lattice when preferences are substitutable.en
dc.description.sponsorshipBoth authors acknowledge financial support received from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) under project ECO2014_57442_P and from Fondecyt under project No. 1151230. Romero-Medina acknowledges financial support received from Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain) PR15/00306 and MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444), and Triossi acknowledges financial support received from the Institute for Research in Market Imperfections and Public Policy, ICM IS130002, Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo [Chile]. We thank Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, José Alcalde, Luis Corchón, Umut Dur, Lars Ehlers, Hideo Konishi, Thayer Morrill, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo, Tayfun Sönmez, Bertan Turhan, Utkun Ünver, and Yosuke Yasuda for their helpful comments. Triossi acknowledges the hospitality of Collegio Carlo Alberto, and Romero-Medina acknowledges the hospitality of Boston College afforded while writing this paper.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.issn2340-5031
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/24368
dc.identifier.uxxiDT/0000001513
dc.language.isoeng
dc.relation.ispartofseriesUC3M Working papers Economicsen
dc.relation.ispartofseries17-05
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. ECO2014_57442_P
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. PR15/00306
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. 2014-0431
dc.relation.projectIDComunidad de Madrid. S2015/HUM-3444/MADECO-CM
dc.rightsAtribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRightsopen access
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.jelC78
dc.subject.jelD78
dc.subject.otherMany-to-manyen
dc.subject.othercontractsen
dc.subject.otherultimatum gamesen
dc.titleTake-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching marketsen
dc.typeworking paper*
dc.type.hasVersionAO*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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