The European court of human rights and religion: Between 'Christian' neutrality and the fear of Islam

Cebada Romero, Alicia

Publication:
The European court of human rights and religion: Between 'Christian' neutrality and the fear of Islam

dc.affiliation.area	UC3M. Área de Derecho Internacional Público	es
dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Derecho Internacional Público, Eclesiástico y Filosofía del Derecho	es
dc.affiliation.instituto	UC3M. Instituto Universitario de Estudios de Género	es
dc.contributor.author	Cebada Romero, Alicia
dc.date.accessioned	2014-07-01T12:46:25Z
dc.date.available	2014-07-01T12:46:25Z
dc.date.issued	2013-11
dc.description.abstract	The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR), remains open to different constitutional formulae regarding the regulation of the relationship between state and religion. At the present moment non-secular, soft secular and hard secular constitutional arrangements coexist in Europe. A general pre-requisite of the European Convention order is the obligation for states to remain neutral towards religious beliefs and religious institutions. In both secular and non-secular constitutional frameworks, the states' commitment to neutrality is especially relevant to preserve pluralism. In this regard, it is especially disappointing to ascertain that the Court has fallen short of providing a consistent interpretation of the obligation of neutrality. The analysis of the case law provided in this paper demonstrates that the ECtHR offers a biased interpretation of the state's duty of neutrality which, on the one hand, better serves the interest and needs of the Christian churches and, on the other hand, shows the ECtHR's fear of Islam. With its simplistic and reductive reading of Islamic rules and traditions, the Court might be contributing to the negative stereotyping of public manifestations of the Islamic faith. The ECtHR should try to offer a more consistent construction of the state's duty of neutrality that is more respectful of religions other than Christianity, instead of hiding behind the doctrine of the margin of appreciation to mask its fear of Islam.	en
dc.format.extent	27
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitation	The New Zealand journal of public and international Law, v. 11, n. 1, nov. 2013, pp. 75-102	en
dc.identifier.issn	1176-3930
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage	75
dc.identifier.publicationissue	1
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage	101
dc.identifier.publicationtitle	New Zealand journal of public and international law	en
dc.identifier.publicationvolume	11
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/19033
dc.identifier.uxxi	AR/0000012087
dc.language.iso	eng	es
dc.publisher	New Zealand Centre for Public Law	en
dc.relation.publisherversion	http://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/centres/nzcpl/publications/nz-journal-of-public-and-international-law/pdfs/volume-11,-issue-1/Romero.pdf
dc.rights	New Zealand Centre for Public Law and contributors
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/	*
dc.subject.eciencia	Derecho	es
dc.title	The European court of human rights and religion: Between 'Christian' neutrality and the fear of Islam	en
dc.type	research article	*
dc.type.hasVersion	AM	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication