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A Key for John Doe: Modeling and Designing Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols

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dc.affiliation.dptoUC3M. Departamento de Matemáticases
dc.contributor.authorGonzález Vasco, María Isabel
dc.contributor.authorPérez Del Pozo, Angel
dc.contributor.authorSoriente, Claudio
dc.contributor.funderMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad (España)es
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-12T13:32:29Z
dc.date.available2023-12-12T13:32:29Z
dc.date.issued2021-05-01
dc.description.abstractAnonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (APAKE) can be seen as the hybrid offspring of standard key exchange and anonymous password authentication protocols. APAKE allows a client holding a low-entropy password to establish a session key with a server, provided that the client's password is in the server's set. Moreover, no information about the password input by the client or the set of valid passwords held by the server should leak to the other party-beyond whether the client's password lies or not in the server's password database. To the best of our knowledge, all APAKE proposals to date either assume client storage or force the client to remember the index assigned to its password in the server's database. Furthermore, earlier works either provide only informal definitions or fail in some sense to properly model the primitive. In this paper, we provide a formal security model for APAKE, capturing security and anonymity provisions for both clients and servers. In addition, we present two APAKE protocols that only require clients to remember a password and that attain our sought key secrecy and anonymity guarantees. Our first protocol leverages oblivious pseudo-random functions, while the second one builds upon a special type of identity-based encryption scheme.en
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work is partially supported by the NATO Science for Peace and Security program (grant G5448), as well as by the MINECO grant MTM2016-77213-R.en
dc.format.extent18es
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationGonzález Vasco, M. I., Pérez del Pozo, A. L. and Soriente, C. (2021). A Key for John Doe: Modeling and Designing Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, 18 (3), pp. 1336-1353en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1109/TDSC.2019.2919013
dc.identifier.issn1545-5971
dc.identifier.publicationfirstpage1336es
dc.identifier.publicationissue3es
dc.identifier.publicationlastpage1356es
dc.identifier.publicationtitleIEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computingen
dc.identifier.publicationvolume18es
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10016/39070
dc.identifier.uxxiAR/0000032350
dc.language.isoenges
dc.publisherIEEEen
dc.relation.projectIDGobierno de España. MTM2016-77213-Res
dc.rights© 2021, IEEEen
dc.rights.accessRightsopen accessen
dc.subject.ecienciaInformáticaes
dc.subject.ecienciaMatemáticases
dc.subject.otherAnonymityen
dc.subject.otherPassword authenticationen
dc.subject.otherGroup key exchangeen
dc.titleA Key for John Doe: Modeling and Designing Anonymous Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocolsen
dc.typeresearch article*
dc.type.hasVersionAM*
dspace.entity.typePublication
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