Strategy-proof coalition formation

Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo

Publication:
Strategy-proof coalition formation

dc.affiliation.dpto	UC3M. Departamento de Economía	es
dc.contributor.author	Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
dc.date.accessioned	2006-11-09T11:38:49Z
dc.date.available	2006-11-09T11:38:49Z
dc.date.issued	2005-09
dc.description.abstract	We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the coalition they belong to. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the society. We focus on strategyproof rules on restricted domains of preferences, as the domains of additively representable or separable preferences. In such domains, only single-lapping rules satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and flexibility. Single-lapping rules are characterized by severe restrictions on the set of feasible coalitions. These restrictions are consistent with hierarchical organizations and imply that single-lapping rules always select core-stable partitions. Thus, our results highlight the relation between the non-cooperative concept of strategy-proofness and the cooperative concept of core-stability. We analyze the implications of our results for matching problems
dc.format.extent	607241 bytes
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.identifier.issn	2340-5031
dc.identifier.repec	we055525
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10016/353
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries	UC3M Working Paper. Economics
dc.relation.ispartofseries	2005-25
dc.rights	Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 3.0 España
dc.rights.accessRights	open access
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject.eciencia	Economía
dc.title	Strategy-proof coalition formation
dc.type	working paper	*
dspace.entity.type	Publication