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Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admisions Problems

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5588
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0743
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simple_romero-medina_GEB_2000_ps.pdf (516.22 KB)
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2000
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Elsevier
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Abstract
This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
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Matching problems
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Games and Economic Behavior. 2000, vol. 31, nº 2, p. 294-302
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