RT Journal Article
T1 Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admisions Problems
A1 Alcalde, J.
A1 Romero-Medina, Antonio
AB This paper analyzes simple mechanisms implementing (subselections of) the core correspondence of matching markets. We provide a sequential mechanism which mimics a matching procedure for many-to-one real life matching markets. We show that only core allocations should be attained when agents act strategically when faced with this mechanism. We also provide a second mechanism to implement the core correspondence in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
PB Elsevier
SN 0899-8256
YR 2000
FD 2000
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5588
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5588
LA eng
NO Alcalde’s work is partially supported by the Institut Valenciad’Investigacions Econòmiques and DGICYT under project PB 97–0131. Romero–Medina acknowledgesfinancial support from the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales and DGICYT underproject PB 92–0590.
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RD 29 may. 2024