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A theoretical model of nations, regions and fiscal integration

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URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10016/5506
ISSN: 0166-0462
DOI: 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2005.07.001
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theorical_ortuno_RSUE_2006_ps.pdf (497.25 KB)
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2006
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Elsevier
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This paper analyzes how the incentives of regions differ from those of nations when choosing a supranational fiscal arrangement. Two types of fiscal arrangements are studied: a Union of nations and a Federation of nations. Under the Union, there is full fiscal integration, and under the Federation, there is only partial fiscal integration and partial insurance against local risks. We show that the claim that regions have stronger incentives than nations to form a supranational Union rather than a Federation might be true only in the case where regions have strong incentives to be part of a centralized nation.
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Federalism, Fiscal coinsurance, Migration
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Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2006, v. 36, n. 1, pp. 132-157
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DE - Artículos de Revistas